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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joseph A. Knight timely appealed form the district court's judgment of conviction.
On appeal, Mr. Knight asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the State's evidence. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred when
it ruled that his mere presence at a residence when a search warrant was executed
created probable cause to arrest him for the offense of "frequenting." 1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
During the summer of 2013, Detective Wadsworth was investigating Charles
Ziebach whom Detective Wadsworth suspected was trafficking in methamphetamine. In
June and July of 2013, Detective Wadsworth and a confidential informant conducted
two controlled purchases of methamphetamine at Mr. Ziebach's home.

1O; Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp.4-5.)

(Tr., p.11, Ls.7-

Detective Wadsworth monitored both of these

controlled buys with a radio device, and Mr. Knight's name was never mentioned.
(Tr., p.16, L.10- p.17, L.17.)
On August 19, 2013, Detective Wadsworth searched Mr. Ziebach's garbage and
found items he associated with drug use. (Defendant's Exhibit 1, p.5.) While Detective
Wadsworth found letters addressed to Mr. Ziebach, he did not find any documents
referencing Mr. Knight. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.20, L.19.) After Mr. Ziebach's garbage was
searched, Detective Wadsworth obtained a search warrant for Mr. Ziebach's home; the
warrant did not mention Mr. Knight. (See generally Defendant's Exhibit 1; R., pp.150151.)

1

The offense commonly referred to as "frequenting" is codified in I.C. § 37-2732(d).
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Approximately two hours prior to the execution of the warrant, Officer McClure
with several other officers placed Mr. Ziebach's home under surveillance.

(Tr., p.10,

L.23 - p.11, L.15, p.36, L.9 - p.37, L.17.) Officer McClure did not observe Mr. Knight
while surveilling Mr. Ziebach's residence. (Tr., p.37, Ls.13-17.)
When the search warrant was executed, members of a SWAT team blocked the
front and back doors of Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.25, Ls.4-23, p.38, Ls.6-15.) All of
the occupants in Mr. Ziebach's home were handcuffed and removed from the residence.
(R., p.151.) According

to Detective Wadsworth, every person found in the house was

supposed to be handcuffed for officer safety but not arrested. (Tr., p.26, L.20 - p.27,
L.1.) However, Officer McClure testified that the plan was to arrest everyone found in
Mr. Ziebach's home for the offense of frequenting. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.19, p.95,
L.20 - p.96, L.3.)
Mr. Knight was one of the people secured by the SWAT team. 2 (Tr., p.25, L.25 p.26, L.1.) After being removed from Mr. Ziebach's home, Detective Vanderschaaf was
instructed to conduct a "pat-down" search of Mr. Knight. (Tr., p.76, L.6 - p.77, L.5.) The
purpose of this search was to look for both weapons and contraband. (Tr., p.76, L.6 p.77, L.5.) Prior to the pat down search of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf testified
that he visually inspected Mr. Knight and he was wearing a T-shirt and jeans. (Tr., p. 78,
L.16 - p.79, L.14.) Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that did not notice any bulges
in Mr. Knight's pockets. (Tr., p.78, L.16 - p.79, L.14.)
While patting down Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf felt something in
Mr. Knight's pocket that he knew was not a weapon. (Tr., p.82, Ls.11-14.) From the
initial touching, Detective Vanderschaaf could not tell if the contents of Mr. Knight's

2

pocket were contraband.

(Tr., p.83, Ls.11-17.)

In order to determine what was in

Mr. Knight's pocket, Detective Vanderschaaf grabbed, squeezed, and felt the contents
of Mr. Knight's pocket. (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-12, p.78, Ls.4-15.) Detective Vanderschaaf then
emptied the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket and he discovered a straw and a baggie
which he thought were drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.80, L.16- p.81, L.3, p.73, L.16- p.74,
L.5.) Mr. Knight was eventually arrested. (R., p.150.)
Sometime after Mr. Knight was removed from Mr. Ziebach's house, Detective
Wadsworth entered the home and discovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia
located in a safe, which was in a closet in Mr. Ziebach's master bedroom. (Tr., p.14,
Ls.2-16.)

There is nothing in the record indicating that either drugs or drug

paraphernalia were found elsewhere in the residence. (See generally, Tr.)
After Mr. Knight was arrested, he was charged, by information, with possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and an enhancement for previously being
convicted for an offense under the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. 3 (R., pp.36-39.)
Mr. Knight filed a suppression motion and supporting memorandums, wherein he
argued that his mere presence at Mr. Ziebach's home at the time the arrest warrant was
executed did not create probable cause to arrest him for frequenting.
105-125, 139-149.)

(R., pp.60-61,

Mr. Knight also argued, among other things, that Detective

Vanderschaaf's decision to empty Mr. Knight's pockets was an illegal warrantless
search because there was no evidence indicating that Mr. Knight was formally under
arrest at that time. (R., pp.105-125, 139-149.) The district court denied Mr. Knight's

However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Knight was armed and
dangerous. See Section l(D), infra.
3 It does not appear that Mr. Knight was ever charged or citied for frequenting.
(R., pp.36-39; Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp.4-5, Defendant's Exhibit 3, p.1.)
2

3

motion to suppress, ruling that since Mr. Knight was in Mr. Ziebach's home at the time
the search warrant was issued, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight for
frequenting.

(R., p.156.) The district court then ruled that the warrantless search of

Mr. Knight was a search incident to an arrest and that the exact timing of Mr. Knight's
arrest was irrelevant because there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight for
frequenting prior to the time he was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf. (R., pp.154156.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Knight pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance and preserved his ability to challenge the denial of his suppression
motion on appeal.

(R., pp.163-172.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified

sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
Mr. Knight on probation. (R., pp.176-181.) Mr. Knight timely appealed. (R., pp.185189.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Knight's motion to suppress the State's
evidence?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Knight's Motion To Suppress The State's
Evidence
A.

Introduction
In order to incur criminal liability for the offense of frequenting, the defendant

must actually know that s/he was in a place where drug activity was occurring.
I.C. § 37-2732(d). Due to this knowledge element, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held
that mere presence alone at a place where a drug related search warrant was executed
does not establish probable cause for the offense of frequenting. State v. Crabb, 107
Idaho 298 (Ct. App. 1984 ). In this case, the district court ruled that Mr. Knight's mere
Mr.

home created probable cause to

him for frequenting.

As such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Knight's suppression motion,
because the basis for that ruling was rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Crabb.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to

a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress.

First, an appellate court defers to the

district court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,

State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). Second, this Court reviews de nova
the trial court's application of constitutional and legal principles to the facts as found. Id.
at 485-486.

6

The Search Incident To Arrest Exception To The Warrant Requirement Was Not
Applicable To the Search Of Mr. Knight Because His Mere Presence At
Mr. Ziebach's Home At The Time The Search Warrant Was Executed Did Not
Give Rise To Probable Cause For the Offense Of Frequenting
Mr. Knight has liberty interests which are protected by the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t}he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."

Further, Mr. Knight has similar liberty interests

protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Christensen,
131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 is
to

protect

Idaho citizens'

expectation

of privacy

arbitrary

governmental intrusion.").
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Tyler, 153
Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 2012). The State has the burden to establish the applicability
of an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App
2001 ). A search incident to a lawful arrest is exempted from the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 215 (Ct. App. 1984 ). A warrantless
arrest and warrantless search incident to that arrest can legally occur in the event the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a public
offense.

Id.

If an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that an arrestee

committed an offense, a search incident to an arrest can legally occur before the
arrestee is formally arrested. Id.
Probable cause is information which would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the subject of
arrest is guilty. State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 677 ( 1979). Moreover, a probable cause
7

determination must be made on particularized facts. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
283 (Ct. App. 2005).

Even though the record does not reflect whether Mr. Knight was searched before
or after he was formally arrested, the district court ruled that Detective Vanderschaaf's
search of Mr. Knight was exempted from the warrant requirement as a search incident
to an arrest because Detective Vanderschaaf had probable cause to believe that
Mr. Knight was guilty of frequenting before he searched Mr. Knight. (R., pp.153-156.)
According to the district court:
Here, where the officers had probable cause to believe that the location
was being used as a drug house, there was also probable cause to
believe that anyone inside the house would have knowledge of the
purpose for which the house was being used. Thus, there was probable
cause to believe that anyone in the house was frequenting and could be
arrested for that crime. Such an arrest determination was made by the
officers prior to the search, for everyone the officers located in the
residence.
(R., pp.156-157.) However, Mr. Knight's mere presence in Mr. Ziebach's home at the
time the search warrant was executed, alone, is not enough to establish probable cause
for the offense of frequenting, because the applicable statue, I.C. § 37-2732(d), required
Mr. Knight to have actual knowledge that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used as a
place to either sell or consume drugs. Idaho Code Section 37-2732(d) follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises
of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being
manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution,
transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away. A
violation of this section shall deem those persons guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than three
hundred dollars ($300) and not more than ninety (90) days in the county
jail, or both.
I.C. § 37-2732(d) (emphasis added). Mere presence in Mr. Ziebach's residence alone
was not enough evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Mr. Knight was
8

guilty of frequenting because law enforcement must have some particularized evidence
indicating that Mr. Knight actually knew Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug
activity. Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283. For example, if drugs or drug paraphernalia were
found in plain view in the area were Mr. Knight was initially found in Mr. Ziebach's
home, then a person reasonably could conclude the Mr. Knight was aware that drugs
were either being sold, used, or given away at Mr. Ziebach's home.

Absent such a

particularized fact, there is no evidence which could be used to support the conclusion
that Mr. knight actually knew Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related
activates.
Support for Mr. Knight's argument can be found in State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298
(Ct. App. 1984 ). In that case, an undercover investigator, Douglas Williams, received a
call from Robert Shook, who offered to sell him some cocaine. Id at. 301. Mr. Shook
said he needed to get the cocaine from his "source", and that Mr. Shook and the
"source" would meet Mr. Williams in a parking lot. Id.

After Mr. Williams ended his

phone call with Mr. Shook, a second investigator, who was surveilling Mr. Shook,
observed Mr. Shook leave his residence and go to a mobile home. Id. Mr. Shook and
another man left the mobile home and met Mr. Williams in a parking lot, where money
and cocaine exchanged hands. Id. A few minutes after this transaction, Mr. Shook and
his companion were stopped and arrested. Id.
Based upon on the testimony of Mr. Williams and the second investigator, a
search warrant was issued for a nighttime search of the mobile home. Id. Later that
same evening, law enforcement executed the search warrant. Id. While executing the
search warrant, Mr. Crabb appeared at the entrance of the mobile home and was
immediately placed under arrest for frequenting. Id. Mr. Crabb was then taken into the
9

mobile home where law enforcement found a small amount of marijuana in plain view
on a coffee table. Id. Mr. Crabb was then searched and law enforcement discovered
marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. Mr. Crabb filed a motion to suppress evidence
which was denied. Id. Mr. Crabb appealed. Id.
On appeal, Mr. Crabb argued, based on the requirement in I.C. § 37-2732(d) that
the defendant have actual knowledge that the residence was being used for drug
activity, his mere presence at the mobile home at the time law enforcement executed
the search warrant did not create probable cause to arrest him for frequenting. Id. at
303. The Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that that "statute requires a person
'frequent a place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being held for
distribution,' etc." Id. (original emphasis). "The statute precludes the interpretation that
a person violated the statute simply by his presence at a place where controlled
substances are sold." Id. The Court of Appeals went on to hold:
The officers in the present case arrested Crabb the moment he
appeared at the door of the mobile home. They did not then have reason
to suspect that Crabb knew that illegal controlled substances were being
held at that place. Thus, Crabb was arrested for his mere presence at a
place suspected of containing controlled substances. While the officers
may have had the right to detain Crabb for investigation during the
ensuing search of the premises pursuant to a valid warrant, they had no
right to arrest him or search his person at that time. Therefore, the search
of Crabb's person cannot be upheld as a search incident to ... [an] arrest.
Id. (original emphasis).

Further support for Mr. Knight's argument can be found in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979), where the United States Supreme court held:
It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable
cause to search the tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the
warrant was executed.
But, a person's mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person. Where the standard is
probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by
10

probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This
requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact
that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another
or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.

Id. at 91; see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) ("[A] person, by
mere presence in a suspected car, [does not lose] immunities from search of his person
to which he would otherwise be entitled.").

Based on the foregoing, the district court

erred when it ruled that Detective Vanderschaaf had probable cause to arrest Mr. Knight
for frequenting merely based on Mr. Knight's presence at Mr. Ziebach's home at the
time the arrest warrant was executed.
Additionally, there are no facts in this record indicating that Mr. Knight knew that
Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related activities.

Detective Wadsworth

monitored both of the controlled buys which occurred at Mr. Ziebach's home in June
and July of 2013, and never heard Mr. Knight's name mentioned during those
transactions. (Tr., p.16, L.10 - p.18, L.13.) Detective Wadsworth did not discover any
information during the search of Mr. Ziebach's garbage that connected Mr. Knight to
Mr. Ziebach or Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.20, L.19.) Officer McClure did
not observe Mr. Knight while he was surveilling Mr. Ziebach's home prior to the
execution of the search warrant. (Tr., p.36, L.9 - p.37, L.17.) Detective Vanderschaaf
testified that his first encounter with Mr. Knight, in regard to this matter, was after the
search warrant was executed. (Tr., p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.23.)
While Detective Vanderschaaf and Officer McClure had previous interactions
with Mr. Knight, the record does not disclose the nature of those contacts as being
either innocent interactions in the community or criminally related interactions.
(Tr., p.40, L.25 - p.41, L.12, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.15.) Further, Detective Wadsworth had

11

no prior interactions with Mr. Knight and first "became familiar" with him after the search
warrant was executed. (Tr., p.10, Ls.21-24.)
There was no evidence found in plain view during the search of Mr. Ziebach's
home which would indicate that the people present in that home when the search
warrant was executed would have been aware that the home was being used for drug
related activity. After the occupants of Mr. Ziebach's home were handcuffed and the
home

was

secured,

Detective

Wadsworth

discovered

methamphetamine

and

paraphernalia located in a safe, which was in a closet in Mr. Ziebach's master bedroom.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.2-16, p.26, L.2 - p.27, L.10, p.37, L.18 - p.39, L.10; R., p.151.) There is no
other evidence indicating that drugs or drug paraphernalia were discovered elsewhere
in Mr. Ziebach's home. (See generally Tr.) Additionally, there is no evidence that any
of the occupant's of Mr. Ziebach's home implicated Mr. Knight in drug related activities.
(See generally, Tr.)

Moreover, the items found in Mr. Ziebach's safe were found after

Mr. Knight was searched by Officer Vanderschaaf.

(Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.4.) As

such, the discovery of that contraband could not be used to establish probable cause
that Mr. Knight was aware that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related
activities at the time he was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf.

(Tr., p.30, L.23 -

p.31, L.4.)
In sum, the district court held that Mr. Knight's mere presence at Mr. Ziebach's
home at the time the search warranted was executed created probable cause to believe
that Mr. Knight actually knew that Mr. Ziebach's home was being used for drug related
activity. The district court erred because the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held
that mere presence alone when a search warrant is executed is not enough to establish
probable cause for the offense of frequenting.
12

Since the State did not produce any

evidence which would indicate that Mr. Knight was aware of the fact that Mr. Ziebach's
home was being used for drug activity it failed to meets its burden to establish the
applicability of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

D.

The Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Weapons Frisk Exception To The Warrant
Requirement Was Not Applicable To Detective Vanderschaaf's Search Of
Mr. Knight
Another exception to the warrant requirement is commonly referred to as the

stop-and-frisk-exception. 4 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court held that after an individual is detained based on reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot, the officer may frisk for weapons if s/he has a reasonable
belief that the suspect is armed and the officer is concerned for his safety. "An officer
may frisk an individual if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the individual with whom the officer is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel this belief." State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App.
2012). In analyzing whether a weapons frisk was warranted, courts "look to the facts
known to the officer on the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn
from the totality of those specific circumstances." Id.
In this case, there are no particularized facts which support the conclusion that
Mr. Knight posed a threat to officer safety after he was handcuffed and removed from

Mr. Knight is not challenging his initial detention because "a warrant to search for
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (footnote omitted).
4

13

home.

Officer McClure

that Mr.

hands were handcuffed

behind his back when he was initially detained.

) When

Wadsworth arrived at Mr. Ziebach's home he observed Mr. Knight sitting on
ground with his arms handcuffed and behind his back.

(Defendant's Exhibit 2;

Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.28, L.23.) Prior to the search of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf
testified that he visually inspected Mr. Knight and he was wearing a T-shirt and jeans.
(Tr., p.78, L.16 - p.79, L.7; Defendant's Exhibit 2.) Detective Vanderschaaf testified that
upon his visual inspection of Mr. Knight he did not notice any bulges in Mr. Knight's
pockets. (Tr., p.79, Ls.8-14.) Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that he could not
see into Mr. Knight's pockets or otherwise tell from his visual observations that
Mr. Knight had anything in his pockets.

(Tr., p.85, Ls.5-14.)

As such, Detective

Vanderschaaf did not observe any bulge which would lead a reasonable person to
believe Mr. Knight was armed.
There is no evidence in the record indicating that law enforcement perceived
Mr. Knight as a credible threat to their safety. Detective Vanderschaaf testified that at
the time he searched Mr. Knight, other present law enforcement officers did not have
their weapons drawn and the weapons were either "slung" or "holstered." (Tr., p.79,
L.25 - p.80, L. 7.)

When asked if he perceived any risk of danger to himself or

Mr. Knight when he conducted the initial pat-down search of Mr. Knight, Detective
Vanderschaaf said that he did not.

(Tr., p.84, Ls.5-11.)

When asked if there was

anything which would suggest Mr. Knight posed a threat to Detective Vanderschaaf or

Detective Wadsworth testified that he discovered weapons while conducting the
search of Mr. Ziebach's home. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-25.) However, the weapons were
discovered after Mr. Knight was searched by Detective Vanderschaaf. (Tr., p.30, L.18 p.31, L.4.) Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that Mr. Knight either knew about
or had access to the weapons discovered in Mr. Ziebach's home. (See generally Tr.)
5
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any other law enforcement, Detective Vanderschaaf said no.

(Tr., p.84, Ls.15-18.)

Detective Vanderschaaf also testified that he did not think that Mr. Knight posed a flight
risk. (Tr., p.84 Ls.19-22.) Detective Wadsworth testified that Mr. Knight could not have
fled and he did not pose a threat to officer safety. (Tr., p.30, Ls.1-11.)
While Officer McClure and Detective Vanderschaaf had some prior contacts with
Mr. Knight, the nature of those contacts were not in the record. (Tr., p. 40, L.25 - p.41,
L.12, p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.15.) When asked if he was aware of Mr. Knight having a
"history for weapons-type charges" Officer McClure testified, "Not as I recall." (Tr., p.47,
L.25 - p.48, L.5.) Detective Wadsworth had no prior interactions with Mr. Knight and
first "became familiar" with him after the search warrant was executed.

(Tr., p.10,

Ls.21-24.)
Since there was no evidence that Mr. Knight possessed a weapon and no
evidence that law enforcement perceived him as either a threat to safety or a flight risk,
there were no particularized facts which would allow Detective Vanderschaaf to pat
down Mr. Knight in a limited search for weapons.
Even if this Court determines that there was a constitutional basis to search
Mr. Knight for weapons, that basis abated after Detective Vanderschaaf determined that
Mr. Knight did not have any weapons. Moreover, Detective Vanderschaaf's decision to
manipulate the contents of Mr. Knight's pockets, after determining that he did not have
any weapons, unconstitutionally exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry weapons
frisk.

The scope of a weapons frisk is "carefully limited" to a "search of the outer

clothing."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

In the event an officer discovers an object but

concludes it is not a weapon, the officer cannot further manipulate the object to
ascertain the object's identity. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
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Detective Vanderschaaf testified that the purpose for his "pat-down" search of
Mr. Knight was to locate either weapons or contraband. (Tr., p.76, Ls.6-14.) Detective
Vanderschaaf testified that he felt something in Mr. Knight's pocket, but when asked if it
felt like a weapon he said "No, it was something in his pocket." (Tr., p. 78, Ls.13-15,
p.81, Ls.22-24, p.82, Ls.11-14.) When asked if he was squeezing and feeling for items
during the initial pat down of Mr. Knight, Detective Vanderschaaf said yes. (Tr., p.78,
Ls.4-15.) Detective Vanderschaaf provided the following testimony indicating that he
could not tell what Mr. Knight had in his pocket:
Q:

When you conducted this initial pat-down of Mr. Knight and you felt
this somethin~J could you, based on your training and experience as
a police officer, your training and experience in a narcotics
investigation, ascertain whether that something was contraband at
any time?

A:

Just initially touching it? No.

Q:

Okay. There was nothing about the something that you felt that
would suggest it was a meth pipe? Correct?

A:

No.

Q:

Nothing about it that suggested it was a bindle? Correct?

A:

Well, it was soft, so it could have been a bindle?

Q:

But you don't know for sure?

A:

No.

Q:

That would be pure speculation. Correct?

A:

Yes.

(Tr., p.83, L.11 - p.84, L.4.)
Even after illegally manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket Detective
Vanderschaaf could not tell if the objects contained therein were contraband. It wasn't
until he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket and pulled out the straw and the baggie that
16

he

developed

reasonable

methamphetamine.

suspicion

that

Mr.

(Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.3.)

Knight

was

in

possession

of

As such, Detective Vanderschaaf

conducted another illegal search when he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket.
In sum, there are no facts in this case which justify Detective Vanderschaaf's
decision to search Mr. Knight for weapons.

Even if there was a justification for the

weapons frisk, Detective Vanderschaaf exceeded the scope of a permissible weapons
frisk because Detective Vanderschaaf determined that Mr. Knight did not have a
weapon, and then started manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket. Even after
manipulating the contents of Mr. Knight's pocket, Detective Vanderschaaf could not tell
what was in Mr. Knight's pocket. So again, Detective Vanderschaaf conducted another
illegal search when he put his hand in Mr. Knight's pocket and removed the contents.
Only after this third illegal search did Detective Vanderschaaf actually develop probable
cause to think that Mr. Knight was in possession of a controlled substance.

E.

Detective Vanderschaaf's Search Of Mr. Knight Was Not Exempted From The
Warrant Requirement Under The Consent Exception
Another recognized exception from the warrant requirement is commonly

referred to as the consent exception. A search conducted with freely given consent is
an exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,
219 (1973). The State has the burden to demonstrate by the preponderance of the
evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given. State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho
705, 714 (Ct. App. 2012). "It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent,
the State must conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the
consent." Tyler, 153 Idaho at 626. "The standard for measuring the scope of consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness-what would the
17

typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and
the suspect." Id.
There is no evidence in the record indicating that Mr. Knight consented to either
the general search of his person of the specific search of his pocket.

Detective

Wadsworth did not have a conversation with Mr. Knight so he did not know if Mr. Knight
ever consented to a search. (Tr., p.30, Ls.12-17.) Detective Vanderschaaf testified that
he could not remember if Mr. Knight gave him consent to conduct a "pat-down" search.
(Tr., p.84, Ls.12-14.) As such, the consent exception to the warrant requirement is not
applicable in this matter.

F.

The evidence Discovered During Detective Vanderschaaf's Illegal Search Of
Mr. Knight Must Be Suppressed
If it is determined that none of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant

requirement were applicable at the time Detective Vanderschaaf searched Mr. Knight
then that search was illegal. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the remedy is
suppression of the State's evidence.

State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v.

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). Additionally, all of the incriminating evidence which
was obtained subsequent to the illegal search should be excluded under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. "If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search
must be excluded as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho
961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). This
includes all of the evidence used to establish a basis for Mr. Knight's possession
conviction.
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As a final note, the State argued to the district court that the inevitable discovery
doctrine should apply in this matter preventing the suppression of the State's evidence.
(R., pp.135-136.)
doctrine."

"An exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery

State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 (Ct. App. 2006).

The inevitable

discovery doctrine applies when a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that
the information would have inevitably been discovered by lawful methods. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984 ). In support of its inevitable discovery argument, the

State points out that law enforcement had a predetermined plan to arrest everyone who
was present at Mr. Ziebach's home for frequenting and that the evidence discovered
during Detective Vanderschaaf's search of Mr. Knight would have been legally
discovered during the booking procedures at the county jail. (R., pp.135-136.) This
argument is flawed because, as argued above, Mr. Knight's presence alone at
Mr. Ziebach's home at the time the search warrant was executed did not give rise to
probable cause to arrest him for frequenting and there was no evidence discovered
during the search of Mr. Ziebach's home which would have supplied probable cause to
arrest Mr. Knight for frequenting.

Again, the evidence discovered at Mr. Ziebach's

home was located in a safe, which was located in a closet of Mr. Ziebach's master
bedroom. (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-16.) Assuming that Mr. Knight was not searched by Detective
Vanderschaaf, there still would not have been enough evidence to arrest Mr. Knight for
frequenting. As such, the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable under the facts
present in this matter.
In sum, the evidence discovered when Detective Vanderschaaf illegally searched
Mr. Knight should be suppressed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Knight respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2014.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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